THERE is a saying that I often heard from elders in my days of youth. They used to say, "Kufa kwemuJoni kamba haivharwi" when someone important failed to turn up for an event or something that was anticipated didn’t happen.

I have no clue about the origin of that saying but I suspect it has something to do with the colonial experience. I am told it literally means that the death of an officer does not necessarily mean that all business must cease. More generally, it is that the failure of one thing does not necessarily mean that everything else has failed.

I am reminded of this old saying, as I observe the developments on the Zimbabwean political scene and in particular Zanu PF’s decision, apparently supported by Sadc, to convene Parliament, notwithstanding that the talks have yet to yield a meaningful result.

The MDC has gone some way to gain fluency in the difficult and complex language of African politics and given the circumstances of Zimbabwe, African leaders have found it increasingly difficult to ignore Morgan Tsvangirai and his party. But it is repeating the obvious to say that one should avoid total faith in the African leaders because many of them have too many skeletons in their own cupboards.

Sadc was only going to be a key player in the heat of the tragic circumstances of Zimbabwe’s elections from March to June. Time, being of the essence, was always going to be the enemy in the long run. Because, sure enough, the more the dispute dragged on, the less there would be the world’s attention and consequently the less the pressure on the African leaders, to "do something" about Zimbabwe, to borrow the ubiquitous phrase whenever Zimbabwe is mentioned.

As it happens, the Beijing Olympics and the Russia-Georgia conflict have robbed Zimbabwe of its prime slot in the global media. Indeed, in the order of priorities, the worry of global leaders is over Georgia and Russia’s actions and less about Africa. Zimbabwe is lucky to get the few seconds on prime time news. And with less media attention, African leaders tend to return to familiar type, which is why Sadc’s lackadaisical approach to Zimbabwe is hardly surprising.

Sadc’s failure so far to resolve the Zimbabwean problem is testament to its youth and inexperience. It simply lacks the cojones to confront the likes of President Robert Mugabe. There was always going to come a time when Sadc would be ready to take a quick-fix deal. It’s hardly surprising, therefore, that Sadc appears to have largely endorsed the deal on the table, contrary to the expectations of Tsvangirai and his faction of the MDC. It is unlikely that Sadc will return soon to consider the matter and it now appears that pressure will be exerted on Tsvangirai to agree, notwithstanding his concerns, however genuine they may be.

For Mugabe, Sadc could not have delivered a better gift. For months, he has suffered the ignominy of being the outcast, shunned by his erstwhile comrades bar President Thabo Mbeki. At some point, even his old battle-hardened comrade, Angola’s President Eduardo dos Santos appeared to have deserted him in his hour of need. But, it now appears, he took the opportunity over the weekend to argue his case and convince them that what he was presenting to his political nemesis was reasonable under the circumstances.

For Sadc to agree that it may be necessary to convene Parliament is a significant step in that it symbolically acknowledges Mugabe’s presidency — after all it is he who will preside over the opening of the legislative body. That process had been suspended in order to deal with the power-sharing issues and, in the process, Mugabe’s legitimacy. Yet, as is common cause, Mugabe’s presidency is at the core of the talks.

It was thought that pressure from Sadc, even in the form of the dreaded sanctions would be more effective to bring Zanu PF into line. That prospect was, for the opposition, more likely at the height of the disquiet over the chaotic elections. But in the aftermath of the recent Sadc Summit, that now seems very unlikely. Mugabe appears to have managed to put off that very uncomfortable pressure point. And that, too, is the opposition’s loss in this game of high stakes.

Zanu PF was desperate not to form a government at its greatest point of weakness after the elections. Its main option was to seek some accommodation with the MDC, and use the MDC as a "Juice-Card", that is, in the language of mobile telephony, to secure some much-needed credit to run for another few years. If that failed, the sub-option was to endeavour to be seen as being conciliatory and willing to work with the opposition. That, at least it hoped, would show its reasonable side.

svangirai’s reluctance to sign is a result of fear of being used as Mugabe’s "Juice-Card". But given Sadc’s current stance, Zanu PF appears to have managed to persuade its erstwhile comrades that it is being reasonable in trying to accommodate the opposition. The pressure from Sadc, it now appears, is on the MDC to agree, however messy the deal is.

On its part the MDC’s options are rather limited. It may be right to refuse to be used as a "Juice Card" by Zanu PF if the power-sharing agreement is hollow but it has to acknowledge that it has failed through legal means to remove Zanu PF from power. The MDC does not appear to have the facility or will to front a popular revolt. This closure of options is why the MDC has agreed to talk to Zanu PF otherwise it would use other methods.

For my part, I think it is futile to think that Zanu PF was ever going to commit political hara-kiri on the negotiating table, when it went to such great and, quite frankly, despicable lengths, to cling on in the first place. There is, perhaps, need for some reality check on the part of the opposition, recognising its strengths and limitations and appreciate that what it would get through negotiations was always going to be far short of what it could get through a total revolutionary victory.

The other option often touted by some people is the so-called "tongai tione" stance; in other words, for the MDC to stand aside and let Zanu PF govern in self-destruct mode. To their credit, of late, the MDC leaders have shown none of this boycott approach to politics. They know it may provide fodder for popular rhetoric but they also realise that the talks are their most viable option at this delicate stage. They have consistently shown a willingness to engage in order to resolve the differences. It has been argued previously in these pages that entry into government will have its positives and negatives and the challenge upon the MDC is to make sure that the positives outweigh the negatives.

Crucially, they know that failures in their march to power are consequent upon Zanu PF’s exclusive control of the state apparatus, from the media, finance, the security forces and importantly, the electoral machinery. What they need to consider is whether entry into government would lend them some influence and, possibly, control over these structures. Are they likely to succeed in the next election whilst they remain outside government or will their chances be better when they can counter Zanu PF’s influence in the state machinery? If they remain outside, what will have changed in the next five years in terms of Zanu PF’s strategies if it retains exclusive control of the state machinery? These are questions the MDC needs to consider its decision-making process.

For my part, I do not think the MDC has to enter government on the basis that it will create any miraculous changes in the next five years. It won’t have the capacity to do that; not even the promised billions will deliver those changes. Rather I have always viewed MDC’s entry into government in strategic terms. I am convinced that total control will never be delivered by Zanu PF on the negotiating table. Remaining on the outside will simply perpetuate more of the same.

There is not going to be total change at this stage, no, not even the "tongai tione" approach can deliver that total control in the end — it simply postpones some form of accommodation between the parties. The main reason for the opposition to enter the ranks of government is strategic, with an eye on the next phase of elections. Perhaps by then, if it stays clean, it might have neutralised some of Zanu PF’s influence in the state machinery.

By Alex Magaisa: based at Kent Law School, The University of Kent. He can be contacted at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it or This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

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